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DISUNIFORMITY 
Jason Rantanen and Lee Petherbridge, Ph.D.*  
Abstract 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is a response 
to a failure in judicial administration that produced a fractured, unworkable 
patent law—one that Congress concluded ill-served entrepreneurship and 
innovation. The purpose of the response—vesting exclusive jurisdiction for 
patent appeals in the Federal Circuit—was to permit that court to develop 
patent law in the direction of greater clarity and uniformity. Both at the 
time of the Federal Circuit’s creation and again more recently, scholars, 
judges, and practitioners have waged great debates over whether patent law 
uniformity furthers the ultimate goals of entrepreneurship and innovation. 
These debates have rested on a largely untested empirical proposition: That 
the Federal Circuit’s patent law jurisprudence embodies a move towards 
doctrinal uniformity. This Article reports an empirical study that examines 
patent law uniformity through the measure of open decisional disagreement 
between Federal Circuit judges. Its central empirical observation is a 
remarkable increase in decisional disagreement—indicative of a decline in 
doctrinal uniformity—among Federal Circuit judges over the past several 
years. This Article raises and discusses several possible explanations for its 
surprising observations, including, inter alia, the Supreme Court’s 
influence and personnel changes at the Federal Circuit. It also considers 
what the observations and explanations might contribute to a current 
debate over the merits of Congress’s decision to unify patent jurisdiction in 
the Federal Circuit. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over thirty years ago, through the vehicle of the Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1982, Congress established the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit .1 Congress granted the court a broad swath 
of subject matter jurisdiction,2 but the court is perhaps most famous for its 
exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals whether arising from decisions 
of the U.S. District Courts, the Court of Federal Claims, the International 
Trade Commission, or the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.3  
When it comes to patent law, Congress’s goal for the court is not 
seriously disputed. In the time leading up to the creation of the Federal 
Circuit, the United States faced “economic recession, high unemployment, 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. 
(2012)). 
 2. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012) (providing the court with jurisdiction over final decisions of the 
United States Court of International Trade, final determinations of the United States International 
Trade Commission, final decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board, and final decisions of 
agency boards of contract appeals). In addition to § 1295, Congress provided the court with 
jurisdiction over appeals involving, inter alia, patents and trademark registration. Id. § 1338. 
Congress also included tax refund claims, “any other civil action or claim against the United States, 
not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or 
any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United 
States” and takings claims in the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction. Id. § 1346. Accord S. REP. NO. 97-
275, at 4 (1981) (“[T]he Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit provides such a forum for appeals 
from throughout the country in areas of the law where Congress determines that there is special 
need for national uniformity.”); id. at 6 (“The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will not be a 
‘specialized court,’ as that term is normally used. The court’s jurisdiction will not be limited to one 
type of case, or even to two or three types of cases. Rather, it will have a varied docket spanning a 
broad range of legal issues and types of cases.”). 
 3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295. 
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mass layoffs of scientists and engineers, and extreme inflation.”4 Such 
economic conditions encouraged the federal government to consider what 
might be done to improve matters, and a Carter administration “Domestic 
Policy Review” indicated that one policy approach to relieving the nation’s 
economic “malaise” was to encourage innovation.5  
When considering the impact of patent law (one of many policy tools 
available to influence innovation), Congress was confronted with reports 
indicating that the legal infrastructure of the patent system was in disarray. 
Various reports, and testimony, for example, showed that patent law varied 
dramatically depending upon the courtroom and circuit in which parties 
found themselves.6 Other information demonstrated that the patent office 
was “‘freelancing’ with respect to the standards of patentability,” thereby 
encouraging a divergence between the legal frameworks applied by the 
patent office and the courts to central questions of patent law.7 The picture 
that emerged was one of an awkward legal infrastructure. The patent office 
and its reviewing court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 
developed and applied standards of patentability to decide whether patents 
should validly issue, and the regional circuit courts developed and applied 
their own different standards to determine whether a given patent had 
validly issued.8 Congress, moreover, was informed that the Supreme Court 
rarely stepped in to resolve inconsistencies in patent law, and might not be 
well equipped to do so even if it were so inclined.9 
                                                                                                                     
 4. Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 822 (2005). 
 5. Marion T. Bennett, The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—Origins, 
in THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY 1982–1990 1, 8 
(1991). 
 6. See Charles W. Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: More Than a 
National Patent Court, 49 MO. L. REV. 43, 55–57 (1984) (noting regional circuit variability in 
standards for patentability); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in 
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989) (noting that patents were “twice as likely to be 
held valid and infringed in the Fifth Circuit than in the Seventh Circuit, and almost four times more 
likely to be enforced in the Seventh Circuit than in the Second Circuit”); see, e.g., S. REP. NO. 97-
275, at 5 (reporting that “patent law [i]s an area in which the application of the law to the facts of a 
case often produces different outcomes in different courtrooms in substantially similar cases”). 
 7. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?: An Empirical 
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1115 (2004). 
 8. See Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 6 (explaining that the PTO was free to develop its own 
standards for patentability, but could not impose those standards on Article III federal courts). 
 9. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 3 (“The Supreme Court now appears to be operating at—or 
close to—full capacity; therefore, in the future the Court cannot be expected to provide much more 
guidance in legal issues than it now does.”); Adams, supra note 6, at 45 (noting the heavy workload 
imposed on the Supreme Court that makes it difficult for the Court to resolve circuit conflicts); 
Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 6 (speculating that docket problems and a lack of expertise may 
contribute to the lack of patent cases reviewed by the Supreme Court). 
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Legislators were told that the resulting lack of uniformity in patent law 
harmed innovation because it enhanced uncertainty about how the law 
would treat the outputs of investment in technological entrepreneurship. If 
uncertainty in the patent system could be lessened, it was argued, 
investment returns would be more predictable and innovation would 
increase.10  
Thus, Congress’s goal for the Federal Circuit and patent law is founded 
on a consistent and unambiguous11 line of reasoning: Vesting exclusive 
jurisdiction for patent appeals in the Federal Circuit12 will permit that court 
to develop patent law in the direction of greater clarity, uniformity, and 
predictability in application.  
It is thus somewhat surprising that a survey of the academic literature 
indicates that relatively little attention13 has been paid to the question of 
whether the Federal Circuit has succeeded in making patent law more 
                                                                                                                     
 10. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6 (reporting testimony that stability in patent law has an effect 
on innovation and that reducing uncertainty is important to business decision making). 
 11. It is not only context that informs this interpretation. The legislative history is full of 
statements expressing Congress’s intentions with respect to the court. See id. at 5 (1981), reprinted 
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 15 (“[T]he Federal Circuit . . . provides a forum that will increase doctrinal 
stability in the field of patent law.”); id. at 2 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 11–12 
(stating that one purpose of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 is “to improve the 
administration of the patent law by centralizing appeals in patent cases”); see id. at 6 (1981), 
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 16 (stating a desire for doctrinal uniformity and stability in 
patent law). 
 12. See id. at 7 (“Decisions of this court will have precedential effect throughout the 
country . . . .”). But see Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 
(2002) (returning jurisdiction over a subset of claims to the regional circuits), superseded by statute, 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(b), 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2012)). The legislative history of Public Law No. 112-29 reiterated 
Congress’s original goal in creating the Federal Circuit. H.R. REP. NO. 109-407, at 5 (2006). In an 
early draft of the language that would become section 19(b), the House Judiciary Committee 
remarked that it “believes Holmes Group contravened the will of Congress when it created the 
Federal Circuit,” adding that “the Committee is concerned that the decision will lead to an erosion 
in the uniformity or coherence in patent law that has been steadily building since the Circuit’s 
creation in 1982.” Id. 
 13. There has been a small flourishing of literature recently mirroring somewhat the debates 
surrounding the creation of the Federal Circuit and the weaknesses of uniformity. See Craig Allen 
Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 
1621 (2007); Lee Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421, 455–57 
(2009); see also Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 
1465 (2012) (discussing the Federal Circuits jurisdiction over non-patent cases and how this may 
prevent the court from developing expertise and thus consistency in its application of patent law); 
Diane P. Wood, Keynote Address: Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s Exclusive Jurisdiction 
in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 1–2 (2014) (critiquing the need for a specialized 
patent law appeals court). This is a topic to which we will return later as the empirical results we 
present here relate directly to these issues. See infra Part III. 
4
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 5 [2015], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss5/4
2014] DISUNIFORMITY 2011 
 
uniform.14 The best available evidence on the question comes from a small 
number of comprehensive empirical studies that address some fairly 
ubiquitous patent doctrines. This evidence indicates that some central areas 
of patent law still lack doctrinal uniformity.15  
Another line of evidence that might point in the same direction—the 
direction of incomplete uniformity—comes from a number of reversal (of 
district court judgments) rate studies.16 These studies are of very 
                                                                                                                     
 14. To be clear, by “uniformity,” we are referring to the straightforward idea that, as cases are 
the law, the law is not uniform when judges divide over how they come out. This situation is further 
amplified when, as is typical, judges can actually marshal cases to support competing views of what 
the law is. On this point, a few commentators on an earlier draft suggested a more detailed 
unpacking of the different conceptions that might embody uniformity. For purposes of this study, 
however, we do not see an attempt to parse out concepts such as indeterminacy, predictability, 
precision etc. as particularly helpful in explaining our findings or hypotheses given that in practice, 
all of these concepts tend to be correlated with one another.  
 15. The claim construction doctrine addresses the interpretation of language that defines a 
patent’s scope. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 7, at 1163 (finding evidence of competing 
jurisprudential approaches to claim construction questions); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, 
Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction 
Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 134–35, 137–38, 148 
(Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (showing that the different jurisprudential approaches to claim 
construction questions continue to persist after Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (en banc), an opinion that addresses the doctrinal divide in the Federal Circuit’s approach to 
claim construction issues). The doctrine of equivalents “determines whether an accused infringer’s 
conduct, while not infringing the letter of a patent, may still be enjoined because it is close enough 
to the letter of a patent.” Petherbridge, supra note 13, at 432, 457 (showing evidence consistent 
with judge diversity in the application of the doctrine of equivalents). The inequitable conduct 
doctrine, is designed to punish patent applicants who engage in inequitable behavior towards the 
public while acquiring a patent. See Lee Petherbridge, et al., The Federal Circuit and Inequitable 
Conduct: An Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1349 (2011) (showing evidence that 
Federal Circuit judges may be applying stricter standards to inequitable conduct determinations 
than the lower courts they are reviewing). 
 16. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, 
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 76–77 
(2014) (arguing that although the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate of claim terms decreased between 
2004 and 2011, the de novo standard of review applied to such cases ought to be narrowed to a 
clearly erroneous standard in order to lead to more predictable results and more meaningful trial 
court proceedings); Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim 
Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1143 (2001) (finding “there is a trend showing 
an increase in claim construction modifications and claim interpretation-based reversals” by the 
Federal Circuit since 1998); Christopher A. Cotropia, Determining Uniformity Within the Federal 
Circuit by Measuring Dissent and En Banc Review, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 825 (2010) 
(concluding that “the Federal Circuit . . . lacks uniformity in its thought on legal issues [and] fails to 
use the en banc review process to resolve these disagreements” (emphasis added)); Kimberly A. 
Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 38 
(2001) (finding a “33% reversal rate of district court claim constructions” that “infuses the patent 
system with a high degree of uncertainty until the Federal Circuit rules on claim construction”); 
David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073, 1107 (2010) (arguing 
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questionable usefulness, however, and it might not even be right to 
interpret them as evidence concerning doctrinal uniformity. But because 
we think such an interpretation might be suggested, at least when reversal 
rate studies are taken in view of the comprehensive empirical studies 
mentioned above, we give them some attention here.  
Reversal rate studies have typically focused on just one patent law 
doctrine, claim construction, and are usually interpreted as evidence of 
relatively high reversal rates.17 If the reversal rates reported by these 
studies are in fact “high,”—and it has never been properly shown that they 
are—that could be consistent with a lack of doctrinal uniformity. The main 
problem with interpreting reversal rate studies in the context of the 
question of doctrinal uniformity is that the observed reversal rates might 
have been observed even if the relevant doctrine were fairly uniform. An 
underlying reason for this problem is a statistical error known as “selection 
bias” that occurs when the sample chosen for observation is biased 
somehow. Studies counting outcomes like “reversed” or “vacated” are 
usually thought especially vulnerable to one type of selection bias, 
selection for close cases, because if one assumes the legal process is 
working efficiently, cases that reach a written judgment and written 
decision on appeal might also be cases that present the closest questions 
under the law. 18 They might therefore be expected to distribute fairly 
evenly (or otherwise depending on a number of factors) between reversals 
and affirmances. If efficiency factors encourage the selection of close 
cases, reversal rate studies in isolation become difficult, if not 
impenetrable, to interpret as meaningful to the issue of doctrinal 
uniformity. A reversal rate of 50%, for example, might be found whether 
or not a doctrine is uniform as long as the doctrine—again, whether 
uniform or not—allows for some cases with outcomes that are difficult to 
predict.19  
Keeping this concern in mind, the comprehensive empirical studies 
mentioned earlier are less vulnerable than reversal rate studies (although 
not immune) to the effects of selection bias because they look directly at 
the content of the jurisprudence or look at the judge-dependency of 
                                                                                                                     
that the best interpretation of currently available data is “that the claim construction reversal rate is 
unduly high and has generally been increasing in the last fifteen years”). 
 17. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 16, at 1106 (discussing an article that finds reversal rates 
for claim constructions cases as the highest among all appealed patent law issues); Wagner & 
Petherbridge, supra note 7, at 1127 (noting two separate studies that found reversal rates of up to 
50% for claim construction jurisprudence). 
 18. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 16, at 1101 (noting that “parties will settle all but the 
closest cases”). 
 19. See id. (“Because claim construction is a central issue in a majority of appeals decisions 
on the merits, such an approach suggests that claim construction appeals should be resolved with a 
50 percent reversal rate.”). 
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decisions. Since some of those comprehensive studies demonstrate that the 
law of claim construction still lacks doctrinal uniformity,20 one might 
expect that some component of the reversal rates observed in studies 
looking at the Federal Circuit’s treatment of district court claim 
constructions is a consequence of poor doctrinal uniformity as opposed to 
selection bias.21 Reversal rate studies, on this interpretation, become 
plausibly relevant to the question of doctrinal uniformity. 
Unfortunately, for the purposes of easy analysis, another view of 
selection bias complicates22 this interpretation. Under this alternative view, 
high-appearing reversal rates for specific doctrinal issues might be more 
likely to occur in the context of settled doctrine. The insight here is that 
appellants are likely to direct an appeal toward those specific issues upon 
which the district court clearly erred—i.e., judgments that are inconsistent 
with established doctrine—rather than those that present closely contested 
questions of law. Similarly, appellants are unlikely to appeal those issues 
on which the district court ruled in a manner consistent with established 
doctrine because there is a relatively low likelihood that they will prevail. 
This leads to a somewhat counterintuitive correlation between doctrinal 
uniformity and reversal rates: as doctrinal stability increases at the Federal 
Circuit, one could expect a higher and higher rate of reversal for issues 
involving settled doctrine as appellants shift their focus to other issues to 
argue on appeal, except in circumstances in which the district court clearly 
got it “wrong.”  
If this second view is correct, or, perhaps operates at the same time as 
the more consensus interpretation of selection basis set forth earlier, the 
meaning of reversal rate studies to the question of doctrinal uniformity 
becomes further muddled. Evidence from reversal rate studies is still 
plausibly relevant to the question of doctrinal uniformity, but on the second 
view, if reversal rate studies have, in fact, been observing “high” reversal 
rates it suggests uniformity in claim construction doctrine, placing the 
second view at odds with the evidence of the earlier mentioned empirical 
studies that have directly observed a lack of uniformity in the law of claim 
construction. As one attempts to resolve the conflict between evidence and 
theory, one might plausibly conclude, counter to conventional wisdom, that 
                                                                                                                     
 20. See supra note 15. 
 21. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 7, at 1144–45 (showing that district court 
judgments exhibiting one doctrinal approach were often reversed by Federal Circuit panels taking a 
different doctrinal approach). Further, if uniformity were present, at a minimum, some of those 
cases studied would not have needed appeal.  
 22. Specifically, the view that selection bias for close calls does not necessarily apply to 
individual issues in disputes, but rather there may be other factors driving selection of issues. See 
Jason Rantanen, Why Priest-Klein Cannot Apply To Individual Issues In Patent Cases (Aug. 15, 
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2132810. 
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the reversal rates observed by reversal rate studies are not “high,” rather 
they may be too “low” for a uniform doctrine. This view of claim 
construction reversal rates has never been disproven and might turn out to 
be correct, although the idea that claim construction reversal rates are too 
low is presently a minority perspective. Our purpose here, of course, is not 
to resolve theoretical issues about selection bias and claim construction 
reversal rates; the point to be made is that it is very difficult to understand 
how, in isolation, the evidence available from reversal rate studies applies 
to the question of doctrinal uniformity. Indeed, it is quite possible that 
observations of reversal rates might be unable to reveal anything of 
significance about doctrinal uniformity.  
Beyond the evidence that comes from research, legal scholars23 and 
practitioners24 have also occasionally offered their subjective opinions on 
the question using more traditional approaches to reporting. These writings 
have tended toward the view that the Federal Circuit has improved the 
uniformity of the patent law, although they sometimes express displeasure 
with the content of the doctrine that has developed.25 
An important measure of doctrinal uniformity not yet mentioned is the 
extent to which judges disagree openly, viz. through separate writings in 
judicial opinions, about the content of the law. Judicial disagreement over 
                                                                                                                     
 23. See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Percolation, Uniformity, and Coherent Adjudication: The 
Federal Circuit Experience, 66 SMU L. REV. 505, 539–40 (2013) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, 
Percolation] (“[T]wo courts, hierarchically related, do not create the kind of interchange that is 
necessary to produce optimal law.”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit as an 
Institution: What Ought We to Expect?, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 827, 833 (2010) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, 
What Ought We Expect] (“At the end of the day, it is impossible to know from the data presented 
whether the judges are generating a healthy number of diverse approaches to important new 
questions in patent law or are simply being stubborn.”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of 
Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 827–28 
(2008) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, In Search of] (noting that the Federal Circuit “has done less well in 
using its expertise to keep patent law responsive to changing technological facts and emerging 
national interests”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in 
Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 800–01 (2004) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, A Continuing 
Experiment] (concluding that though the Federal Circuit has dramatically improved the patent 
system, that there is still room for improvement in its operation). See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 
6 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of specialized courts, as well as its effect on formulating a 
uniform system of law). 
 24. See, e.g., Donald R. Dunner, The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Its 
Critical Role in the Revitalization of U.S. Patent Jurisprudence, Past, Present, and Future, 43 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 775, 782–83 (2010) (“The bottom line at the conclusion of the first quarter century of 
the court’s existence is that the court has more than delighted its early proponents and surprised its 
opponents with its high level of performance.”); Dreyfuss, A Continuing Experiment, supra note 23, 
at 770–72 (reporting practitioner views).  
 25. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, Percolation, supra note 23, at 507–08 (suggesting that the Federal 
Circuit has improved uniformity in the application of patent law but the process has been far from 
perfect). 
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the content of the law measures uniformity in both a symptomatic and a 
causative fashion. Judicial disagreement is symptomatic of a lack of 
uniformity because doctrinal variation permits and encourages judges to 
read the law differently. Judicial disagreement is also causative of a lack of 
uniformity because competing views about the content of the law leads to 
competing precedents. These precedents can become crystallized, leading 
to different flavors, standards, and sometimes even different rules within 
the same legal doctrine.  
Perhaps the most objective (and one of the most traditionally accepted) 
way to measure judicial disagreement over the content of the law is to 
measure separate writings. Measuring judicial disagreement over the 
content of the law through separate writings can be imperfect depending on 
one’s point of view. The main problem is that a judge might occasionally 
author a separate writing even if the judge agrees with the majority’s 
decision concerning the judgment under review. For example, a judge may 
write a concurring opinion because he or she finds dispositive an issue the 
majority does not (a procedural one perhaps), and might at least be said to 
agree with the majority’s articulation of the law about the issue the 
majority finds dispositive.26 One the other hand, as noted above, whether 
this example is properly categorized as representing no disagreement about 
the content of the law depends on one’s point of view about what the law 
is. It might alternatively be said that the majority misapplied the law that 
the concurring judge is highlighting, and so the concurring opinion does 
reflect a difference in views about the content of the law. In any event, 
these sorts of cases do not seem that common and so represent a relatively 
small amount of separate opinion writings. 
The more common examples are easier to acceptably categorize as 
reflecting judicial disagreements about the content of the law. Dissents, for 
example, tend to indicate a view that the majority misunderstood the law as 
it applies to the judgment under review, and most concurrences also take 
issue with a majority’s articulation and application of the law to a 
judgment. In these scenarios, such separate writings fairly serve as a 
measure of the extent to which judges disagree about the content of the 
law. 
Surprisingly (particularly in light of the degree to which uniformity is 
so central to debates about the Federal Circuit), the extent to which judges 
openly disagree—that is, show disagreement through separate writings—
about substantive issues of the patent law has been relatively unexplored. 
Of the few studies reporting information about Federal Circuit judicial 
                                                                                                                     
 26. For an extreme example, see DSU Medical Corporation v. JMS Company, 471 F.3d 1293, 
1311 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Michel & Mayer, JJ., concurring) (showing that Judges Michel and Mayer 
concurred, disagreeing merely with the belief that it was even necessary to resolve the issue in the 
case en banc). 
9
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disagreement, perhaps the most significant are from Lefstin, who studied 
dissents at the Federal Circuit from 1983–2005, and Cotropia, who 
compared the Federal Circuit to a selected set of regional circuits on the 
measures of dissents and en banc reviews.27 Lefstin found patent litigation 
before the district courts to be “significantly more indeterminate than most 
other categories of cases reviewed by the Federal Circuit.”28 He also 
observed that while the rate of dissent at the Federal Circuit in appeals 
arising from district courts ranged from 1.41% to 13.27%, with an average 
of 7.35%,29 the rate seemed to be experiencing a heightened level towards 
the end of his study (2002–2005), leading him to call for further 
investigation.30 Cotropia found that for the period from 1998–2009, 
Federal Circuit judges on average tended to dissent in appeals generally 
about as much or more often than their counterparts in other circuits and 
dissented significantly more often when appeals involved patent law.31 
In sum, the comprehensive empirical studies mentioned above that 
directly examine written doctrine and judicial dependency provide what is, 
presently, probably the best evidence concerning doctrinal uniformity. But 
while these studies do address commonly confronted doctrines, and so are 
quite informative, they do not address all aspects of patent law. This leaves 
open the possibility that uniformity has been approached in other areas and 
that perhaps a broader doctrinal assessment would paint a picture of 
generally improved uniformity. Reversal rate studies, when viewed through 
the lens of the empirical studies examining doctrine and judicial 
dependency, might be suggestive of poor uniformity in at least one 
doctrinal area (claim construction), but represent an even narrower sample 
of the patent law than the doctrinal empirical studies. Moreover, as we 
have just explained above, reversal rate studies might be meaningless to 
the question of patent law doctrinal uniformity depending on how they are 
affected by selection bias, a question that presently lacks a consensus 
                                                                                                                     
 27. Jeffry A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminancy, and Interpretation 
at the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1027, 1054 (2007); Cotropia, supra note 16, at 801; 
see also Petherbridge, supra note 13, at 456 (collecting rates of separate writings (concurrences and 
dissents) in Federal Circuit written opinions); Dennis Crouch, Dissenting in Patent Cases, 
PATENTLYO.COM (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/02/dissenting-in-patent-
cases.html (collecting statistics on dissents in three-member-panel patent opinions with Westlaw 
Headnotes released since January 1, 2000). 
 28. Lefstin, supra note 27, at 1089. 
 29. Id. at 1056. 
 30. Id. at 1090 (“Further study—perhaps investigating the influence of changes in court 
personnel—would be necessary before crediting legal or structural factors for the current era of 
dissent.”). 
 31. See Cotropia, supra note 16, at 815–16 (reporting that Federal Circuit judges dissented at 
a rate of 3.51% compared to a range in other circuits of 1.14% to 4.56%, and dissented in patent 
opinions 9.28% of the time over the period studied). 
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answer.  
Studies concerning open judicial disagreement offer researchers a 
relatively unexplored perspective from which to observe doctrinal 
uniformity. Lefstin’s and Cotropia’s studies represent a solid starting point, 
but leave unanswered questions about the dynamics and mechanisms of 
doctrinal uniformity. This Article addresses both these questions.  
This Article reports an empirical study that examines patent law 
uniformity through the measure of open decisional disagreement between 
Federal Circuit judges. It is important to point out that our purpose here is 
mainly descriptive, that is, we aim to observe and describe Federal Circuit 
behaviors that relate to Congress’s fundamental goals for the institution. 
The central empirical observation is a remarkable increase in decisional 
disagreement among Federal Circuit judges over the past several years, an 
observation we interpret as likely to reflect a decrease in doctrinal 
uniformity. While this Article does not attempt to make any airtight 
causative claims, it does discuss possible mechanisms that might explain 
the observations, and, in some instances, relates them to broader ideas 
about patent law uniformity and judicial decision-making.  
What follows proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the study design 
and methodology. Part II presents the data and considers possible 
explanations for the observations. Part III considers what the observations 
might contribute to a current debate over the merits of Congress’s decision 
to unify patent jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit.  
I.  STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS 
In order to examine the rate of agreement among Federal Circuit judges, 
all Federal Circuit written opinions and Rule 36 dispositions (which have 
no written opinion)32 in appeals arising from the district courts for a period 
spanning October 13, 2004 to December 31, 2013 were collected from the 
                                                                                                                     
 32. Under Federal Circuit Rule 36: 
The court may enter a judgment of affirmance without opinion, citing this rule, 
when it determines that any of the following conditions exist and an opinion 
would have no precedential value:  
(a) the judgment, decision, or order of the trial court appealed from is based on 
findings that are not clearly erroneous;  
(b) the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict is sufficient;  
(c) the record supports summary judgment, directed verdict, or judgment on the 
pleadings;  
(d) the decision of an administrative agency warrants affirmance under the 
standard of review in the statute authorizing the petition for review; or  
(e) a judgment or decision has been entered without an error of law.  
FED. CIR. R. 36, available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/rules-of-practice/rules.pdf 
(last visited May 13, 2014). 
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Federal Circuit’s website and reviewed.33 We focused on the set of appeals 
arising from the district courts because the vast majority of these appeals 
involve patent infringement suits.34 Out of concern that the data set might 
be less complete for older time periods,35 samples from Westlaw were 
checked against the dataset. This comparison indicated that while the 
written opinions provided on the website appear to be complete beginning 
in 2004, the Federal Circuit’s website did not contain any Rule 36 
dispositions dated prior to July 11, 2007. Subsequent to that date, the Rule 
36 dispositions were as complete as a sample taken from Westlaw. 
Following collection, the opinions and Rule 36 dispositions were 
reviewed and relevant data recorded. Collected data fields included case 
identifying information, such as case name, date, etc., and decisional 
content information as follows: whether the opinion was a Rule 36 
disposition or a written opinion; whether the opinion was precedential or 
nonprecedential; the degree of panel agreement (unanimous, majority, per 
curiam); whether there were dissenting or concurring judges; the panel 
members; and the authors of each majority, dissenting, or concurring 
                                                                                                                     
 33. The Federal Circuit’s website states that it contains all of the court’s written opinions, “as 
well as orders selected by the court.” See Opinions & Orders Search, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. 
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions-orders/search/report.html (last visited July 8, 
2014). The earliest opinion in an appeal arising from the district courts that was actually available 
on the court’s website, however is On-Line Techs. v. Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer GMBH, 386 
F.3d 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions-orders/0/12950/all/page-
2591-5.html (last visited July 8, 2014). 
 34. To be clear, our dataset encompasses the entire set of appeals arising from the district 
court, not just those that involve issues typical to a patent infringement suit. There are instances 
where the underlying dispute did not involve a patent infringement action. For example, an 
applicant for a patent or trademark registration may appeal certain adverse decisions of the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to either the Federal Circuit or the district courts. See 
35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 145 (2012). In addition, issues unrelated to patent law (such as a contract dispute 
or trademark infringement claim) might be properly appealed to the Federal Circuit if the 
underlying suit involved a patent claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1); see, e.g., 3M Co. v. Mohan, 
482 Fed. App’x. 574, 576–77 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (accepting jurisdiction over trademark infringement 
appeal where, below, the plaintiff had also claimed patent infringement regarding the same facts and 
circumstances). Due to the difficulty of drawing lines between issues that lie on the periphery of 
patent cases, however, we opted to treat the entire dataset as one unit. That said, the overwhelming 
majority of appeals in the dataset involved conventional issues of patent law and the dissents reflect 
that the disagreement is over substantive issues of patent law. Cf. Jason Rantanen, Predicting En 
Banc Issues, PATENTLYO.COM (June 13, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/06/what-
will-be-the-next-federal-circuit-en-banc-case.html (providing a graph of Federal Circuit dissents, by 
subject matter, from June 2010 to June 2012, illustrating that most dissents in that period relate to 
substantive issues). 
 35. Jason Rantanen, Recalibrating Our Empirical Understanding of Inequitable Conduct, 3 
IP THEORY 98, 104 (2013) (explaining that as Westlaw’s database of court filings becomes more 
complete each year, the results of studies that rely on court filing data for multiple years becomes 
distorted because earlier years are not as fully reported on Westlaw as more recent years). 
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opinion. A complete list of the relevant fields is provided at Appendix A. 
The reliability of the data coder was assessed as follows: a subset of 
approximately 10% of the dataset was coded by a second person, and an 
intercoder agreement statistic, Cohen’s kappa,36 was calculated. In all 
instances, the kappa value indicated almost perfect agreement between the 
original coder and the second coder, indicating a high degree of intercoder 
reliability.37 Data was analyzed via standard statistical techniques as 
described in Part II.  
II.  THE RECENT MOVE TOWARDS DISUNIFORMITY AT THE FEDERAL 
CIRCUIT 
Figure 1 shows the degree to which all panel members agreed in 
precedential opinions, presented as a thirty-unit lagged average. While the 
graph reflects only precedential written opinions, the general pattern it 
shows is similar to that observed when all written opinions and Rule 36 
dispositions are taken into account. In both cases there is generally greater 
panel agreement (particularly with Rule 36 summary affirmance since they 
are, by their nature, more likely to occur when panel members are 
unanimous).  
Figure 1 depicts a remarkable downward trend in decisional agreement 
between Federal Circuit judges during the past several years. While the rate 
                                                                                                                     
 36. Jacob Cohen, A Coefficient of Agreement for Nominal Scales, 20 EDUC. & PSYCHOL. 
MEASUREMENT 37, 46 (1960) (discovering and presenting a formula to calculate “[a] coefficient of 
interjudge agreement for nominal scales” that “is directly interpretable as the proportion of joint 
judgments in which there is agreement, after chance agreement is excluded”); J. Richard Landis & 
Gary G. Koch, The Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categorical Data, 33 BIOMETRICS 
159, 164–65 (1977) (providing a chart which translates into plain language various ranges of value 
for the “Kappa Statistic” when it is used to measure the strength of agreement between two data 
scales). 
 37. The Cohen’s kappa for each manually coded field is provided in Appendix A. 
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at which the Federal Circuit’s precedential opinions are unanimous 
certainly exhibits some variation, the trend line suggests a more than 20% 
drop in the rate at which panels were unanimous in precedential opinions 
between the end of 2004 and the end of 2013.38 
 
Figure 2 shows that dissents are an important component of the decline 
in agreement, more forcefully suggesting that the downward trend in 
decisional agreement reflects a genuine decrease in patent law doctrinal 
uniformity. Although not quite as steep as the overall decline in unanimity 
shown in Figure 1, the trend line in Figure 2 reflects a more than 10% 
increase in the rate at which Federal Circuit judges dissent in precedential 
opinions.39  
                                                                                                                     
 38. The regression is significant at the p < 0.01 level. The study endpoints were October 13, 
2004 and December 31, 2013. Both Figures 1 and 2 begin at the 30th precedential opinion, i.e., the 
first lagged average. (Because the 30th opinion did not issue until 2005, the representation on chart 
actually begins in 2005). Note that we are not suggesting that there is a gradual change over this 
time period. Rather, we are simply observing that a change has occurred over time. Various 
reviewers of an earlier draft of this Article noted that there appears to be a break point somewhere in 
the 2009–2011 time period, a suggestion that is consistent with the explanations we offer later in 
this Article. No reviewer, moreover, has seriously disputed that there appears to have been a change 
in court behavior over the period studied. To the extent that some readers might find it more 
empirically persuasive, we conducted a two period Chi-square analysis using January 1, 2010 as a 
break point and found a statistically significant difference (at the p < 0.01 level) between the rate at 
which panel opinions were unanimous before and after this cutoff. To be clear, we are not 
suggesting that January 1, 2010 is the date of some significant event or point of inflection; the date 
is merely an empirically informed, rough point in time useful for testing the idea that there has been 
a change between the early portion of our study and the later portion. 
 39. The regression is significant at the p < 0.01 level. As with the rate at which panel opinions 
were unanimous, a chi-square analysis of pre- and post-January 1, 2010 precedential opinions in our 
study revealed a statistically significant difference at the p < 0.01 level. 
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Viewed together, Figures 1 and 2 suggest that over the study period 
Federal Circuit panels are formally disagreeing40 with increasing frequency 
about the content of patent law. Indeed, at the extreme end, these data 
become even more surprising. For a recent period in the dataset, the thirty-
opinion lagged average was sitting at an astonishing 37% unanimity rate 
for precedential opinions (Figure 1) while 43% of all precedential opinions 
involved a dissent (Figure 2). In other words, the rate at which judges were 
writing dissents had reached a point where it was higher than the rate at 
which panels were unanimous in precedential opinions. 
Taken by itself, this data41 suggests the possibility that Federal Circuit 
patent law today is far from uniform. To the contrary, the data suggests a 
high degree of dis-uniformity in the way Federal Circuit judges understand 
and apply the patent law.  
There are some fairly general issues concerning the central empirical 
observation of this study that are worth dispensing with at the outset. We 
begin by observing that the number of judges at the Federal Circuit has not 
substantially changed during the period studied. To be sure, there have 
been retirements, appointments, and moves to senior status (all of which 
might play a role in our observations, as we shall later discuss), but the 
number of Federal Circuit judges available to hear cases has not changed 
much during the period studied.42  
Another general concern might be that the number of dissents has been 
altered by the Federal Circuit’s overall workload. Here, intuition is 
consistent with literature that suggests an increase in workload should 
produce a decrease in dissents, while a decrease in workload might 
provoke an increase in dissents.43 
                                                                                                                     
 40. These are changes over time that may have begun even before our study period. The rate 
of dissents in all written opinions from the district courts that we observed in the years that our 
study encompassed (2005–2013) ranged from 13.3% to 26.4%, while the rate of dissents in all 
written opinions arising from the district courts from the period encompassed by Lefstin’s study 
ranged from approximately 2% to 13%. See Lefstin, supra note 27, at 1056. 
 41. As noted above, the data pattern holds, although it moderates somewhat for obvious 
reasons, when unpublished (but written) and Rule 36 summary affirmances are taken into account. 
 42. See infra Table 1. 
 43. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 32 (2008) (“Most judges do not like to 
dissent . . . . Not only is it a bother and frays collegiality, and usually has no effect on the law, but it 
also tends to magnify the significance of the majority opinion.” (footnote omitted)); Lee Epstein et 
al., Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
101, 103–04 (2011) (arguing that “dissent rate is negatively correlated with caseload” because a 
higher caseload means each dissent takes more effort to write and additionally garners more ill will 
from the rest of the judicial panel). 
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Figure 3, which depicts the number of appeals terminated by judges at 
the Federal Circuit each financial year44 and the number of dissents written 
that year, appears to show some modest variation that is not inconsistent 
with a modest decline in dissent rates from 2006–2009 as terminations 
increase. The pattern depicted for the period 2009–2013 does not reveal a 
similar relationship. Taking the modest variation together with the 
apparently inconsistent variation in more recent periods, we are inclined 
toward the interpretation that Figure 3 does not provide good evidence that 
the remarkable downward trend in Federal Circuit judicial agreement is 
well explained as a consequence of the court’s overall workload. 
Another similar concern is that the Federal Circuit has changed the 
number of precedential opinions it writes, perhaps concentrating the 
court’s precedential work product on a smaller number of important cases 
more likely to trigger separate writings because of their significance.  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 44. The financial year for the Federal Circuit runs from October 1 of the preceding year to 
September 30. See Statistics, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-
court/statistics.html (last visited July 8, 2014). For example, Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 ran from 
October 2012 to September 2013. Id. Note that because the financial year ended shortly after the 
end of our study period, the number of dissents for FY 2013 was actually one dissent higher than is 
reflected in Figure 3. 
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To examine this possibility, we looked at the number of precedential 
opinions issued by the Federal Circuit during the period studied. While 
Figure 445 does suggest a modest downward trend in numbers of 
precedential opinions, we are inclined to the view that the data does not 
reveal practically meaningful variation and note that in the years in which 
the Federal Circuit had the most dissents (2012 and 2013) the numbers of 
precedential opinions do not seem noticeably low. Figure 5 further 
indicates that the number of dissents in precedential patent cases do not 
seem to be particularly sensitive to the number of precedential patent 
opinions the court authors in a year. It thus appears that changes in 
precedential workload—possibly the most arduous form of judicial work 
and the place where open judicial disagreement is most likely to 
manifest—are not obviously an important driver of changes in judicial 
disagreement. 
                                                                                                                     
 45. Figures 4 and 5 reflect opinions on a calendar year basis.  
17
Rantanen and Petherbridge: Disuniformity
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
2024 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
Finally, if there has been a workload change during the period studied, 
it was for circuit judges probably in the direction of an increase. The reason 
is that during the period studied, while the overall number of Federal 
Circuit judges did not change much, the ratio of active to senior judges did 
change. Table 1 shows that the ratio became smaller, viz. the Federal 
Circuit added a few senior judges and lost one or two circuit judges 
depending on the year considered.  
 
Table 1: Active and Senior Judges at the Federal Circuit,  
2005–201346 
 
Active Judges Senior Judges
2005 12 3
2006 12 3
2007 12 4
2008 12 4
2009 12 4
2010 11 5
2011 10 6
2012 11 5
2013 10 5
 
Because senior judges tend to take on a reduced workload, the effect of 
this development was probably to increase the workload of the active 
judges. That being so, if the change in ratio of active to senior judges had 
an effect on a trend in decisional agreement among Federal Circuit judges, 
the literature, as noted above, suggests that effect would be to suppress, 
rather than promote open judicial disagreement about doctrinal content.47 
The figures just discussed reveal no evidence of such movement, and as 
noted earlier suggest movement in the opposite direction.  
In sum, the overall workload and precedential opinion output seems to 
have been fairly consistent during the period studied, suggesting that 
                                                                                                                     
 46. History of the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/ 
hisj (last visited July 8, 2014) (providing individual profiles of federal judges and a database of 
information on the federal judiciary). Numbers of judges were counted as of the beginning of each 
year. For example, for 2010, eleven active judges (Mayer, Michel, Gajarsa, Linn, Bryson, Rader, 
Newman, Lourie, Dyk, Prost, and Moore) and five senior judges (Archer, Plager, Clevenger, Schall, 
and Friedman) were counted. Id. 
 47. See Epstein et al., supra note 43, at 103–04. We note that Epstein et al. offer a second 
hypothesis, which is that frequency of dissent is positively related to circuit size because the fewer 
the judges, the greater the collegiality costs of dissenting and therefore the fewer dissents. Id. at 
102–03, 135. Our sense is that the variations in numbers of judges are probably much too small for 
this to have a measurable impact here. 
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meaningful explanations for the downward trend in decisional agreement 
among Federal Circuit judges over the past several years may lie 
elsewhere. 
III.  WHY MIGHT FEDERAL CIRCUIT OPINIONS EVIDENCE GREATER 
JUDICIAL DISAGREEMENT? 
The central empirical finding is evidence of a trend of increasing 
judicial disagreement in patent cases at the Federal Circuit across the last 
eight or so years. While the data underlying this study is not robust enough 
to allow us to specify much in the way of an empirical explanation, we are 
nonetheless able to do what law professors typically do: hypothesize about 
what might be causing the apparent trend based on our knowledge of 
events in the patent system and its judicial administration. This Part offers 
several possible explanations for our observations, with the caution that 
none of them are exclusive and that all might be working to some degree to 
encourage the observed increase in judicial disagreement.  
A.  The Doctrinal Role of the Supreme Court 
Perhaps the most obvious place to begin in trying to understand why the 
Federal Circuit is exhibiting greater amounts of open judicial disagreement 
is with the Supreme Court of the United States. We begin by outlining 
three features of the Court’s patent jurisprudence that might help to explain 
how it encourages greater levels of disagreement among Federal Circuit 
judges. 
The first is that the Supreme Court has been positively discouraging 
doctrinal uniformity in patent law, and encouraging legal uncertainty. For 
much of the first quarter-century of the Federal Circuit’s existence, the 
Supreme Court was a relatively rare participant in patent law.48 When the 
Court did intervene, it often did so with the express goal of helping the 
Federal Circuit improve the uniformity of patent law. For example, in 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,49 the Supreme Court determined 
that claim construction was a question for the judge and not for the jury, in 
large part on the theory that such a decision would improve the uniformity 
of the law.50 Similarly, in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,51 the Supreme 
Court was express in its desire to announce a rule of decision even clearer 
                                                                                                                     
 48. This led one commentator to characterize the Federal Circuit as the “supreme court of 
patents.” Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 
387, 387 (2001). 
 49. 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 50. Id. at 390. 
 51. 525 U.S. 55 (1998). 
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and more uniform in application than the one the Federal Circuit had 
developed.52 
The Supreme Court’s patent jurisprudence has since undergone a 
noticeable change, moving in the direction of less uniformity in patent 
law.53 Perhaps one of the earliest examples of this is presented by Court’s 
2002 decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.54 
In Festo, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s attempt to reduce 
uncertainty in the application of the doctrine of equivalents through a 
“complete bar” approach to prosecution history estoppel and replaced it 
with a “flexible bar” approach.55 Another notable case is the Court’s 2006 
decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C.56 By pretty much any 
measure, eBay reduced the uniformity of application of remedies law to 
patent cases, and encouraged judicial discretion in making remedy 
decisions.57 A third example representative of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudential change of heart is KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.58 
That case, which addressed the doctrine of nonobviousness, made the 
application of the law less uniform by rejecting the Federal Circuit’s 
attempt to construct a uniform, evidence driven test for resolving 
obviousness inquiries.59 
The net effect of decisions like Festo, eBay, and KSR has been to 
reduce the uniformity of patent doctrine and to increase the decisional 
space available to judges hearing patent cases and patent appeals. This 
additional judicial discretion permits Federal Circuit judges to indulge their 
normative appetites more frequently than they would be able to under a 
clearer, more uniform jurisprudence.60 The idea here can be nicely 
                                                                                                                     
 52. See id. at 65–66 (“A rule that makes the timeliness of an application depend on the date 
when an invention is ‘substantially complete’ seriously undermines the interest in 
certainty . . . . Thus, petitioner’s argument calls into question the standard applied by the Court of 
Appeals . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 53. Cf. Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP 
THEORY 62, 77 (2013) (concluding that the Supreme Court is in an era of heightened interest in 
patent law).  
 54. 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
 55. Id. at 738–40; see also Holbrook, supra note 53, at 76 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
concern for the Federal Circuit’s preference for bright-line rules as demonstrated by the Festo 
holding). 
 56. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 57. Id. at 394; see also Michael W. Carroll, Patent Injunctions and the Problem of Uniformity 
Cost, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 421, 431 (2007) (describing MercExchange as the 
Supreme Court rejecting the Federal Circuit’s uniform approach to granting injunctive relief). 
 58. 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 59. Id. at 415, 418. 
 60. Another possibility, suggested by one reviewer, is that perhaps when the Supreme Court 
reduces the uniformity of patent law, it is actually increasing the discretion of district judges, which 
should increase affirmance rates and at the same time reduce dissents, because there is less to 
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introduced through the work of John Golden, who recognized that one of 
the ways patent law may develop over time involves a sort of serial 
resetting driven by Supreme Court participation.61 Even more important, 
however, is his argument’s recognition that in many instances the Supreme 
Court might not know what the correct uniform doctrine should be, and so 
in reviewing patent cases might be careful to avoid specifying the law.62 
Instead, the Court might remain content, in most cases, with resetting the 
law—reopening decisional space by moving the law back from the detail 
accumulated by the Federal Circuit’s copious case law—to a more general 
statement or standard. Federal Circuit judges might then, less encumbered 
by older case law, set about re-specifying through another several years or 
decades of cases.63 
A second reason why the Supreme Court may play a role in 
encouraging open judicial disagreement among Federal Circuit judges is 
that the Court has, by many accounts, been authoring decisions in patent 
cases that might be either incoherent or reflect conflicting rules of decision. 
Because the Federal Circuit is duty-bound to follow the Supreme Court, if 
the Court’s various decisions now lead more often to competing outcome 
choices, one might expect Federal Circuit judges to more often come into 
conflict than they did when competing Supreme Court precedents were not 
around (or if they existed in the past had been dealt with to the point that 
the Federal Circuit had reached a common understanding of their role in 
patent jurisprudence). 
The subject matter eligibility cases sharply illustrate this explanation. 
Since 2010, the Supreme Court has issued three opinions relating to 35 
U.S.C. § 101.64 These opinions are—in a word—controversial, and are 
subject to multiple interpretations. The one thing that scholars, judges, and 
                                                                                                                     
disagree about if the only question is whether the district judge abused his discretion. If that is true, 
it makes our findings even more remarkable, because it suggests that the rate of dissent should be 
lower following the cases discussed above, rather than higher. 
 61. John M. Golden, The Supreme Court As “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for 
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 674 (2009). 
 62. Id. at 686, 688. 
 63. A related point is that, as one commentator has observed, the Supreme Court’s resetting 
of patent law may have produced a backlash at the Federal Circuit, in which the court applied a 
hyper-interpretation of the Court’s precedent to reach a result that fits with its policy preferences. 
See Lucas S. Osborn, Instrumentalism at the Federal Circuit, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 419, 419 (2012) 
(arguing that “[t]he Federal Circuit hyper-interprets Supreme Court precedent out of a desire for 
certainty and relatively outcome-determinative rules”). If this is the case, and one keeps in mind that 
an appellate court is not a uniform body but is comprised of multiple judges each with their own 
policy preferences, it would fit in nicely with our suggestion that something is going on in the 
Federal Circuit itself. See infra Subsection III.C.3.  
 64. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc. (Myriad), 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013). 
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practitioners are in agreement on is that these opinions create more legal 
conflict than they resolve.65 This conflict has caused then-Chief Judge 
Rader to repeatedly throw up his hands when faced with a subject matter 
eligibility dispute. “Our opinions spend page after page revisiting our cases 
and those of the Supreme Court, and still we continue to disagree 
vigorously over what is or is not patentable subject matter. Indeed, 
deciding what makes an idea ‘abstract’ is ‘reminiscent of the oenologists 
trying to describe a new wine.’”66  
A third reason the Supreme Court might have responsibility for the 
increase in open judicial disagreement at the Federal Circuit ties the two 
previous reasons together and adds a third: That the Supreme Court has 
become more active in patent law during the period we studied than in 
years past.67 And by more active, we mean that the Court has taken more 
cases, written many more opinions, and in most of those opinions 
disapproved of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence.68 This reason thus 
incorporates the first two reasons. Not only may the Court be resetting 
patent law in specific areas and creating tensions between its precedents, 
but the effect is amplified by the Supreme Court’s increased activity and 
apparent discontent with the current substance of patent law. The Supreme 
Court may, in effect, have been speeding up the rate at which it destroys 
uniformity and introduces uncertainty into the patent law. The behavior of 
Federal Circuit judges might reflect this higher pace of change.  
                                                                                                                     
 65. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Edifying Thoughts of a Patent Watcher: The Nature of DNA, 60 
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 92, 97–102 (2013) (discussing Myriad’s various analyses and the 
difficulty in determining whether products of nature are a patentable subject matter); Dan Burk, The 
“Runcible” Product of Nature Doctrine, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 4, 2013, 3:50 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/the-runcible-product-of-nature-doctrine (noting how Bilski and 
Mayo obfuscated the patentable subject matter analysis and also discussing how trial courts and the 
Federal Circuit have struggled to apply the “products of nature” doctrine as a result); Dan. L. Burk, 
Anticipating Patentable Subject Matter, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 109, 110–11 (Feb. 21, 2013), 
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/Burk_65_SLRO_109.pdf (arguing 
that patent law’s novelty requirement has been mistakenly imported into subject matter 
requirements). 
 66. Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1348 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013) (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 
672 F.3d 1250, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 
 67. Holbrook, supra note 53, at 64 (providing a graph illustrating Supreme Court activity in 
patent, copyright, and trademark cases between 2000 and 2012). 
 68. Between 1982 and 2005, the Supreme Court issued approximately sixteen patent-related 
opinions, an average of about two-thirds of an opinion a year. Between 2006 and the date of this 
writing (December 31, 2013), it issued eighteen such opinions, an average of over two and one-half 
opinions a year. Much of this activity has been concentrated in the last two years: since 2011, the 
Court has issued ten patent-related opinions and is currently poised to issue at least three more this 
term. See Supreme Court Patent Cases, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION, http://writtendescription.blogspot. 
com/p/patents-scotus.html (last visited May 12, 2014). While this Article was in the editing process, 
the Court issued another six opinions relating to patent law. 
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B.  The Signaling Role of the Supreme Court 
A separate set of explanations for the observed increase in open judicial 
disagreement at the Federal Circuit can be usefully thought of in terms of a 
signaling role that the Supreme Court might be playing in patent law. This 
set of explanations is foreshadowed by the last reason we gave in the 
previous Section, particularly by the observation that much of the Supreme 
Court’s recent and rapidly expanding patent jurisprudence appears to 
express discontent with doctrine developed by the Federal Circuit. This 
Section sketches out some of the signals the Supreme Court might be 
sending with its recent blitzkrieg into patent law.  
First, by reentering patent law jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has 
signaled that it is taking at least some of the jurisprudential rein, perhaps 
releasing some of the pressure Federal Circuit judges might feel to 
maintain doctrinal uniformity. For nearly a quarter century Federal Circuit 
judges were practically the sole guardians of Congress’s goal that patent 
law develop and maintain greater uniformity.69 With the Supreme Court 
apparently taking the jurisprudential reins, however, Federal Circuit judges 
may be less concerned that their words will be the final words about the 
content of the patent law. Other judges—Supreme Court justices—will 
have the last word, resolving competing views and unifying the law. Such 
a perception might discourage Federal Circuit judges from taking on the 
costs of building consensus, or, alternatively, it might encourage Federal 
Circuit judges to disagree with each other about the content of patent law. 
This latter choice might be made under the view that by recording doctrinal 
alternatives in their concurrences and dissents Federal Circuit judges will 
be assisting the Supreme Court when it steps in to select the appropriate 
doctrine. 
A second explanation that might work cooperatively with the one just 
laid out is that the reputational reward for writing a dissent has increased 
since the Supreme Court has become more active in patent law. Here, we 
draw upon the economic theory of judicial behavior developed by Richard 
Posner.70 This model views the judge as a “rational, self-interested utility 
maximizer.”71 In other words, judges are driven to maximize their own 
personal utility. In its most simplified terms, this could mean that judges 
are driven to maximize their leisure; but of course, maximization of leisure 
                                                                                                                     
 69. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text (highlighting the pressures the Federal 
Circuit might feel to maintain doctrinal uniformity). 
 70. See generally POSNER, supra note 43, at 36 (“Much of the strategic and even the 
sociological theory of judging can be subsumed under the economic theory,” which focuses on how 
a judge’s leisure preferences may impact her judicial utility, such as by encouraging settlement 
before trial); Epstein et al., supra note 43, at 132 (explaining the economic theory of judicial 
behavior and its relevancy to dissents and ideological heterogeneity). 
 71. POSNER, supra note 43, at 35. 
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is hardly the only thing judges might derive utility from. Judges might, for 
example, also derive utility from their judicial influence, whether from 
having their ideas adopted by other judges or from instituting broader 
reforms in the law. 
Thus, one approach to understanding why judges do what they do is to 
consider judicial choices in terms of costs and benefits. Here, we discuss 
some relevant costs and benefits recognized by existing literature and 
consider how shifts in the Supreme Court’s behavior might affect those 
motivators of judicial behavior. On the one hand, there are two potentially 
substantial costs associated with writing a dissent: (1) it involves effort 
above and beyond that required for the job; and (2) it may cause the 
dissenters to incur reputation costs among their colleagues.72 Generalizable 
benefits on the other hand, tend to flow from the influence and enhanced 
reputation that the judge derives from a dissenting opinion.73 
If one accepts that appellate judges derive utility when they write an 
opinion that is adopted or cited by others, and lose utility when they 
expend energy without those views being adopted or cited (because the 
effort and reputational costs outweigh the benefits from writing the 
dissent),74 it could follow that an appellate judge who writes a dissent for a 
disinterested Supreme Court may obtain little value from doing so. The 
judge might as well be Sisyphus, pushing his rock up the hill and seeing it 
roll back down. Better to join the majority opinion and try to get at least 
some of the judge’s own views included in it. 
That calculus could change in a way that fuels a rise in dissents when an 
active Supreme Court enters the picture. Now, a dissenting judge has the 
potential for a substantial reputational payoff: The Supreme Court might 
grant certiorari and address, and perhaps even adopt a dissenting judge’s 
position.75 Indeed, by dissenting the judge may make it more likely for the 
Court to grant certiorari.76 Put another way, the presence of an active 
                                                                                                                     
 72. See Epstein et al., supra note 43, at 103–04 (discussing the effort cost of writing a 
dissent). 
 73. Id. at 104. We recognize that different judges will place different utility values on these 
costs and benefits. Indeed, some judges may derive benefits simply from expressing their views, 
much like an artist might derive a benefit from the act of creating. See POSNER, supra note 43, at 62. 
In other words, we acknowledge that there may be variation among judges’ behavior. However, we 
think that it is likely that most judges will be influenced, at least at the margins, by the costs and 
benefits we describe.  
 74. An expectation consistent with Epstein et al., supra note 43, at 103–04, and, in these 
authors’ view, with common sense as well. 
 75. An example of the Court adopting a dissenting judge’s opinion can be found in Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., in which Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, 
largely adopted Judge Bryson’s dissent in the panel decision. 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2115, 2120 (2013). 
 76. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, What Ought We Expect?, supra note 23, at 840 (“One thing the 
Federal Circuit has learned to do is to write dissents that attract Supreme Court review.”); Epstein et 
al., supra note 43, at 128–29 (finding that the likelihood of a certiorari grant when a dissent has 
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Supreme Court might encourage a positive feedback loop between dissents 
and reputational rewards that was simply absent when the Supreme Court 
rarely considered patent law. The consistency with which the Supreme 
Court has been rejecting Federal Circuit case law that reflects a majority 
consensus, moreover, might further fuel this mechanism.77 A judge who 
finds utility in being recognized by the Supreme Court may (correctly) 
perceive that he is more likely to obtain utility when the position he takes 
is “against” Federal Circuit law.  
Although this Section is about a role the Supreme Court might play in 
encouraging disagreement between Federal Circuit judges about the 
content of the law, it seems appropriate here to mention that the Supreme 
Court is not the only audience for which Federal Circuit judges write. In 
2011, Congress passed the America Invents Act, the “most significant 
legislative event affecting patent law and practice in more than half a 
century.”78 In doing so, Congress indicated that it, too, intends to play a 
role in the continued development of the patent system. This adds yet 
another audience—along with practitioners and academics—for Federal 
Circuit judges’ opinions,79 and with it the possibility of even greater 
rewards for a successful dissent.80  
C.  There is Something Going on at the Federal Circuit 
An additional set of explanations for our observation that Federal 
Circuit judges are increasingly in disagreement about the content of patent 
                                                                                                                     
been written is statistically significantly higher than in the absence of dissent); Holbrook, supra 
note 53, at 69–70 (commenting that intra-circuit splits at the Federal Circuit can send a signal to the 
Supreme Court). 
 77. See, e.g., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070–71 (2011) 
(criticizing the Federal Circuit’s application of the proper willful blindness standard); Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (“[N]othing in today’s opinion should be read as endorsing 
interpretations of § 101 that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has used in the past.”); 
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 422 (2007) (“What we hold is that the fundamental 
misunderstandings identified above led the Court of Appeals in this case to apply a test inconsistent 
with our patent law decisions.”). 
 78. Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward a System of Invention Registration: The 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 24, 24 (2011). 
 79. See also Mark D. Janis and Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L. 
REV. 72, 86 (2012) (suggesting that the audience for patent law has changed dramatically from the 
past). Indeed, patent law as a field has become more prominent as a result of broad social and 
economic trends. As Tun-Jen Chiang personally commented to us, this may increase both the 
external utility—writing for an audience with the intention of producing a change—and internal 
utility—the opportunity to voice opinions on issues the judges personally care about—of writing a 
dissent. 
 80. See, e.g., Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 
1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Rader, C.J., dissenting); cf. Randall R. Rader, The State of Patent Litigation, 
21 FED. CIR. B.J. 331, 334–35 (2011) (proposing six reforms to patent litigation). 
25
Rantanen and Petherbridge: Disuniformity
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
2032 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
law might be found within the Federal Circuit itself. This Section outlines 
how possible developments at the Federal Circuit might play a role, at least 
in part, in reducing doctrinal uniformity. As before, the reasons we develop 
here are not exclusive and one or more could cooperate to explain our 
observations.  
1.  The Role of New Federal Circuit Judges 
During the period studied, the Federal Circuit underwent an arguably 
unprecedented turnover of judges. Since 2009, the court has experienced a 
50% turnover among active judges.81 The turnover among senior judges 
has been even more dramatic.82 Without question, the composition of the 
court by 2013 had become very different from its composition in 2009, let 
alone 2006. Might the addition of new judges encourage a decrease in the 
uniformity of patent law?  
There is very little literature exploring whether the arrival of new 
judges has an impact on doctrinal uniformity, and what there is might lead 
in different directions. Perhaps the most on point work—since it addresses 
the Federal Circuit—is that of Wagner and Petherbridge.83 Based on 
empirical evidence from judicial opinions, their work suggests that (then) 
new Judges Dyk and Linn were disruptive forces in Federal Circuit 
jurisprudence; in particular, that they were largely responsible for pushing 
the proceduralist agenda in the court’s claim construction jurisprudence.84 
Given this precedent, perhaps part of an explanation for the observation 
that patent law doctrine appears increasingly disuniform is that a set of new 
judges with different views of the law than older Federal Circuit judges 
have arrived at the Federal Circuit.  
This interpretation stands in some contrast to other work, not directly 
concerned with the Federal Circuit but concerned nonetheless with new 
appellate judges, that suggests that new judges are less likely to author 
dissenting opinions than experienced judges. The idea behind this 
suggestion has been labeled the “freshman effect,” and emphasizes the 
notion that new judges are less likely to write majority or dissenting 
opinions than their more experienced colleagues due to the need to 
                                                                                                                     
 81. Judges Schall, Mayer, Linn, and Bryson took senior status and Judges Gajarsa and Michel 
retired from the court altogether. Judge Gajarsa initially took senior status before retiring from 
service in 2012. Those six vacancies, of a total of twelve judgeships, were filled by Judges 
O’Malley, Reyna, Wallach, Taranto, Chen, and Hughes. For more information on judicial 
nominations and vacancies, see JUDICIALNOMINATIONS.COM, http://www.judicialnominations.org/ 
(last visited May 12, 2014). 
 82. With the exception of Judge Plager, the set of senior judges at the end of our period 
studied was completely different form the set of senior judges at the beginning of our period 
studied.  
 83. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 7, at 1153. 
 84. Id. 
26
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 5 [2015], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss5/4
2014] DISUNIFORMITY 2033 
 
acclimate to their new environment.85 A predication based on this literature 
is that the new judges on the Federal Circuit are less likely to dissent from 
their colleagues, at least during an initial acclimatization period.86  
Figure 6 shows the twenty-unit lagged averages of separate opinion 
authorship in precedential decisions by each judge who joined the court 
during our study period and for whom we had sufficient data.87 Although 
the data is limited, it does not seem consistent with a “freshman effect.”  
 
Indeed, Figure 6 might even suggest the opposite of a “freshman 
effect”: that these three judges wrote dissents and concurrences at a 
relatively high individual rate during their initial “acclimation” period.88 
Given these results, perhaps it is the case new judges writing more 
dissenting opinions than expected (a number of dissents that might have 
been even higher if there is a freshman effect at work) explains, at least in 
part, our observations.  
Additionally, there is some literature suggesting that new judges can be 
disruptive even if they are not writing the separate opinions themselves. 89 
                                                                                                                     
 85. See Hettinger et al., Acclimation Effects and Separate Opinion Writing in the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 792, 793 (2003) (finding empirical support for the hypotheses that new 
appellate judges are less likely to author dissenting opinions). 
 86. For example, Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek used a 2-year cutoff to test their 
hypothesis about the freshman effect. Id. at 796.  
 87. Thus, Judges Wallach, Taranto, and Chen were not included because there was 
insufficient data for those judges. Figure 6 represents the rate at which each listed judge wrote a 
second opinion (dissent, concurrence, or both) in connection with a precedential opinion for which 
they were a panel judge.  
 88. Judge Moore had been on the court for over 2 years by point 34 on Figure 6, Judge 
O’Malley by point 35, and Judge Reyna by point 36. 
 89. See Scott P. Johnson & Christopher E. Smith, David Souter’s First Term on the Supreme 
Court: The Impact of a New Justice, 75 JUDICATURE 238, 243 (1992) (concluding that even though 
he did not author many important opinions, he nevertheless exercised significant influence over 
important issues during his initial term merely through his presence and participation). 
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Indeed, we observe from a comparison of Figures 2 and 6 that the rate of 
separate opinion authorship by these three judges individually does not 
approach the dissent (alone) rate of the court as a whole, suggesting that 
there may be other factors at play. Therefore, it is possible that the addition 
of new judges to the Federal Circuit has encouraged a decrease in doctrinal 
uniformity through a mechanism that involves, perhaps, their very presence 
and participation in cases. This strand of the literature ties in nicely with 
the next Subsection, because the role for senior judges might well involve 
a reaction to the presence, participation, and opinion writing of new judges. 
2.  A Role for Senior Judges 
As noted earlier, there is presently little evidence that the absolute 
number of Federal Circuit judges and the court’s overall workload are 
sufficient to explain the decline in uniformity we observed. Earlier, 
however, we did note that “retirements, appointments, and moves to senior 
status” might inform an explanation.90 The data presented earlier also point 
out that there might be a correlation between the observed increase in 
dissents and the substantial increase in senior judges relative to active 
circuit judges—many of whom are new judges.91 Here, we introduce the 
idea that senior judges might play a role as caretakers of the circuit law, 
and in the case of the Federal Circuit, perhaps as caretakers of an 
institution, which could, under conditions that might be present, lead to the 
apparent decrease in doctrinal uniformity reported in this study. 92  
The idea is informed by a number of factors, and in the end provides a 
mostly circumstantial, but reasonably plausible case that is open to future 
empirical testing. At the outset, however, it is important to understand our 
use of the the term “senior judges.” Earlier in this Article, where we 
present empirical data about the Federal Circuit’s workload, we use the 
term senior judges to refer to those Federal Circuit judges that have taken 
senior status.93 By contrast, when we use the term senior judges in this 
Subsection, the term is used in two ways. First, the term refers to judges 
who have accumulated considerable seniority: those of long tenure on the 
Federal Circuit, whether or not they have elected to take senior status. 
                                                                                                                     
 90. Supra text accompanying note 42. 
 91. See supra text accompanying notes 46–47. 
 92. Surprisingly, while it is well established that senior judges may have different attributes 
from active judges (especially junior judges), there appears to be relatively little in the literature 
about how these differences might manifest in terms of judicial behavior. Cf. Erin B. Kaheny et al., 
Change over Tenure: Voting, Variance, and Decision Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 52 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 490, 493 n.3 (2008) (noting that “[r]elatively few judicial studies exist to guide 
expectations about senior judges”).  
 93. See supra text accompanying notes 46–47. 
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Examples would include Judges Lourie and Newman,94 and could include 
long tenured judges that recently retired rather than take senior status. 
Second, where relevant, the term, as used earlier, can also mean judges 
who have taken senior status. These judges not only have long Federal 
Circuit tenures, but might in some circumstances experience cost and 
benefit possibilities different from the first category of senior judges. Much 
but not all of the discussion in this Subsection is relevant to both meanings 
of “senior judge.” Fortunately, it tends to be obvious from the discussion 
when one form of senior judge is likely more relevant than another.  
To begin with, it would seem to often be the case that senior judges are 
walking around with a lot more circuit law in their heads than new judges. 
Indeed, senior judges may have grappled with the precedent being applied 
in a case on several occasions. Thus, as a basic matter, senior judges may 
simply know the law better than brand new appellate judges. This might 
make it easier for senior judges to spot weaknesses, limitations, and errors 
in the use of precedents and arguments advanced by new judges.  
The doctrinal knowledge advantage of senior judges might be further 
amplified by the fact that patent law is a notoriously difficult subject.95 
Thus, not only might the gap in doctrinal knowledge and nuance between a 
highly experienced senior judge and a new judge be vast, new judges might 
also sometimes be operating with very difficult, unfamiliar law in the fog 
of vigorous advocacy. Taken together, these factors might lead a new judge 
to overlook or perhaps misinterpret relevant circuit law while such errors 
might be immediately apparent to an experienced senior judge.  
Senior judges, moreover, may not have only grappled with the 
precedent being applied on previous occasions, they may have even voted 
in the cases giving rise to the precedent or authored some of the opinions. 
They might therefore have a belief about what the court was trying to 
communicate in the opinion—for example, what interpretations the court 
was attempting to leave open or foreclose by the language it selected—and 
might desire to see that new judges applying the precedent get it “right.”  
Senior judges on the Federal Circuit might also be “uniformity hawks.” 
Many of the senior judges on the court witnessed its creation, and many 
others were appointed during the era when Congress’s views about 
uniformity in the patent law were widely known and embraced.96 These 
                                                                                                                     
 94. Judge Lourie was confirmed in 1990, and Judge Newman was confirmed in 1984. See 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, JUDICIALNOMINATIONS.ORG (last visited May 14, 2014), 
http://judicialnominations.org/. 
 95. See, e.g., Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 599 F.2d 685, 706 (5th Cir. 1979) 
aff’d, 448 U.S. 176 (1980) (“Mr. Giles S. Rich observed on several occasions during the hearings 
on section 271 that patent law is ‘the metaphysics’ of the law and that contributory 
infringement/patent misuse issues are the metaphysics of patent law.”). 
 96. Cotropia, supra note 16, at 806 (detailing Congress’s establishment of and vision for the 
Federal Circuit). 
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judges may themselves have embraced the philosophy, perhaps stated as: 
as long as the rules choices are reasonable, it may be more important to 
have clear and uniform rules than it is to have any particular rule. If some 
senior judges are of the view that new judges are authoring opinions that 
disturb a uniformity they labored and compromised to create—for 
example, by authoring an opinion inconsistent with an older precedent—
they might be motivated to dissent on the theory that the dissent will call 
attention to the departure, or that the dissent might help preserve the older 
precedent.  
Judges that have taken senior status also probably have more 
opportunities to dissent, because as noted earlier they tend to carry a 
smaller workload.97 Thus, not only might senior judges have vastly more 
circuit law at their fingertips than new judges, the opportunity cost 
(resources lost to other cases or other activities if a dissent is undertaken) 98 
for choosing to write a dissent might be lower99 for senior judges.100 The 
reputational cost of dissent too—especially if that dissent is directed to a 
new judge with whom a senior judge might expect to rarely sit—might also 
be expected to be lower for senior judges than for circuit judges. Therefore, 
if a senior judge wants to take on the role of teacher and doctrinal guardian, 
cost considerations might encourage her to do so.  
Taken together, there is a case to made for the idea that senior judges—
or at least very experienced judges if not technically senior—might occupy 
the role of teacher, and caretaker of the circuit law in a manner that might, 
as a reaction to a large influx of new judges, manifest as the apparent 
decrease in doctrinal uniformity reported in this study. Unfortunately, this 
possibility highlights an area where further empirical research is needed. 
One might, for example, examine whether judges’ behavior in terms of 
dissents changes when they assume senior status or varies by a judge’s 
original appointment year. The dataset used in this study, however, 
provides only two such substantive before and after comparisons and 
                                                                                                                     
 97. Senior judges can fulfill their obligations by carrying a caseload “which is equal to or 
greater than the amount of work involving courtroom participation which an average judge in active 
service would perform in three months.” 28 U.S.C. § 371(e)(1)(A) (2012). 
 98. See Albert Yoon, As You Like It: Senior Federal Judges and the Political Economy of 
Judicial Tenure, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDS. 495, 533 (2005) (reporting a comment from a senior 
judge that taking senior status allowed “more time for reflection on the cases undertaken, less 
frustration in trying to keep up and more peace of mind”). 
 99. Whether it would be lower depends of course on what other things the senior judge is up 
to, for example, the extent to which a senior judge might increase his or her leisure. 
 100. Cf. Epstein et al., supra note 43, at 129 (noting that “[a] greater number of judges lowers 
the collegiality cost of dissenting, [and] a lighter workload lowers the opportunity cost of 
dissenting”). 
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accordingly sheds little light on the validity of this idea.101 Future work, 
however, will also have to account for the possibility that senior judges 
have a causal impact on the court’s separate writing rate, even if it is not 
senior judges authoring the opinions.102 One means of exploring this 
possibility might involve investigating the impact of panel composition on 
dissents.  
3.  A Decline in Judicial Collegiality 
In The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, Judge Harry 
T. Edwards of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
wrote that “collegiality plays an important part in mitigating the role of 
partisan politics and personal ideology by allowing judges of differing 
perspectives and philosophies to communicate with, listen to, and 
ultimately influence one another in constructive and law-abiding ways.”103 
Collegiality is not homogeneity or conformity; rather, what Judge Edwards 
was referring to was the idea that judges “are willing to listen, persuade, 
and be persuaded, in an atmosphere of civility and respect.”104 This 
collegiality is important: “The more collegial the court, the more likely it is 
that the cases that come before it will be determined solely on their legal 
merits,” 105 as opposed to the judges’ personal preferences. 
One real possibility is that our observations might be explained by a 
breakdown in judicial collegiality at the Federal Circuit.106 Here, we refer 
not to the idea that members of the court may have differing ideological 
preferences, but rather that a lower level of collegiality has caused those 
preferences to drive the courts’ opinions.  
Central to these observations is the increase in dissents noted above. 
While dissenting opinions can be healthy for a court, too many dissents 
may suggest that judges on the court are simply talking past each other. In 
his work on collegiality, Judge Edwards—himself an insider at a court not 
                                                                                                                     
 101. For Judge Schall, his rate of dissents stayed approximately the same at 8%, but for Judge 
Mayer, his rate of dissents drastically increased from 12% to 39%. 
 102. For example, not including judges having taken senior status, it is the senior active panel 
judge that decides opinion authorship, a factor that might be involved in stimulating separate 
writings by newer judges.  
 103. Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1639, 1645 (2003). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Cf. Lefstin, supra note 27, at 1090 (hypothesizing that perhaps the era of elevated dissent 
he observed beginning in 2002 “could mark either an increase in the indeterminacy of legal 
questions considered by the circuit or a breakdown in the structural constraints that tended to 
suppress dissent in the decade preceding”). 
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all that different structurally than the Federal Circuit107—wrote that: 
In an uncollegial environment, divergent views among 
members of a court often end up as dissenting opinions. Why? 
Because judges tend to follow a “party line” and adopt 
unalterable positions on the issues before them. This is 
especially true in the hard and very hard cases that involve 
highly controversial issues. Judges who initially hold different 
views tend not to think hard about the quality of the 
arguments made by those with whom they disagree, so no 
serious attempt is made to find common ground. Judicial 
divisions are sharp and firm. And sharp divisions on hard and 
very hard issues give rise to “ideological camps” among 
judges, which in turn beget divisions in cases that are not very 
difficult. It is not a good situation.108 
Even without the empirical metrics reported in this Article, it is easy to 
see a reflection of the current Federal Circuit in Judge Edwards’ 
description of the hypothetical “uncollegial” court. As an illustration, 
consider the chasms that run through the court’s recent jurisprudence on 
subject matter eligibility.109 One need examine only a handful of these 
opinions to recognize that the judges are simply not talking to each other in 
their opinions. Instead, they appear to be battling for positions within the 
court of public opinion.110  
                                                                                                                     
 107. For references comparing the twelve regional circuit courts of appeal to the Federal 
Circuit, see S. Jay Plager, The United States Courts of Appeals, The Federal Circuit, and the Non-
Regional Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a Model, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 853, 
854–55 (1990); John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of 
Two Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 573–74 (2010) (comparing the D.C. 
Circuit to the Federal Circuit and concluding that lessons learned from the D.C. circuit may extend 
to the Federal Circuit particularly in regard to Supreme Court involvement). 
 108. A Conversation with Judge Harry T. Edwards, 16 WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 66 (2004). 
 109. See, e.g., Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, L.L.C., 722 F.3d 1335, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2013); id. at 
1354 (Lourie, J., concurring) (responding to the majority opinion, authored by Chief Judge Rader); 
Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 
2013); id. at 1346 (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (responding to the majority opinion, authored by Judge 
Lourie). 
 110. See, e.g., Accenture Global Servs., 728 F.3d at 1346, 1348 (Rader, C.J., dissenting) 
(expressing annoyance with frequent disagreement and confusion among the judges); Apple Inc., v. 
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 725 F.3d 1356, 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Reyna, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (highlighting the impact of smartphones, the benefits of a touch screen, and 
Apples’ innovation in developing a touch screen that should not be considered an infringement of 
prior art inventors). Some commentators have suggested that we might also consider a failure of 
leadership at the court. While we, again, are not in a position to have first-hand knowledge of this 
issue at the court, there are suggestions of at least some tensions within the court related to the issue 
of leadership. See Dan Levine, Insight: Rocker Judge Juggles Tech Policy, Supreme Court and the 
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If collegiality between Federal Circuit judges has diminished—and we 
reiterate that we are not in a position to offer first-hand knowledge about 
whether this is the case111—then the court may have trouble resolving 
some of the most challenging issues it faces in a meaningful way unless 
and until that collegiality returns. We might also expect more fractured 
opinions representative of a deeply divided court such as the multiple 
opinions in CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp.,112 which produced a 
legal framework that at least one judge on the court seems to think is 
binding precedent and at least one judge thinks has no precedential effect 
at all.113 
4.  A Shift in Appellate Philosophy 
Another phenomenon our observations might be detecting is that the 
Federal Circuit is changing its appellate philosophy. This explanation fits 
nicely with the presence of new judges, who one might classify as 
philosophical movers. But this explanation serves just as well if new 
judges have nothing to do with it. In the Introduction we explained how the 
Federal Circuit is a response to a failure in judicial administration that had 
produced a fractured patent law. The purpose of vesting exclusive 
jurisdiction for patent appeals in the Federal Circuit was to permit that 
court to develop patent law in the direction of greater clarity, uniformity, 
and predictability in application.114 By many accounts, the appellate 
philosophy evinced by Congress’s creation of the Federal Circuit found a 
home in early Federal Circuit jurisprudence.115  
 
                                                                                                                     
Stones, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2013, 9:22 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/11/us-usa-
judge-rader-insight-idUSBRE9BA06D20131211. 
 111. Although we are not in a position to have first-hand knowledge about the internal 
operation of the court, we would be remiss in not acknowledging the substantial discussion 
following Judge Rader’s resignation, first from his position as Chief Judge and then from the court 
entirely. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Critics Fault Court’s Grip on Appeals for Patents, WALL ST. J. 
(July 6, 2014), available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/critics-fault-courts-grip-on-appeals-for-
patents-1404688219 (describing dissatisfaction with the Federal Circuit); Warren Woessner, Gone 
Judge—Judge Randall Rader to Resign, THE NAT’L L.R. (June 16, 2014), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/gone-judge-judge-randall-rader-to-resign (detailing Judge 
Rader’s resignation). 
 112. 685 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc), vacated, 484 Fed. App’x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 113. Compare Accenture Global Servs., 728 F.3d at 1341, with id. at 1346–47 (Rader, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 114. Cotropia, supra note 16, at 806 (detailing Congress’s establishment of and vision for the 
Federal Circuit). 
 115. Cf. id. (“One of the critiques related to the Federal Circuit is that Congress was, in a way, 
too successful—the Federal Circuit creates too much uniformity in patent law.”). 
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Perhaps the observations of this study are detecting a change in that 
appellate philosophy. Perhaps the Federal Circuit is itself116 abandoning 
Congress’s goal of a clear and uniform patent law in favor of what it thinks 
is a “better” more contextually sensitive case-customized patent law. Such 
a development might, for obvious reasons lead to the observations reported 
in this Article.  
IV.  WHAT ABOUT UNIFORMITY?  
In this Part, we consider the larger picture of what our findings might be 
uncovering about the role of the various branches of government in the 
patent system. We highlight two main ideas. First, that some combination 
of the Supreme Court, Executive Branch, and perhaps some Federal Circuit 
judges may be working cooperatively to undermine Congress’s goal for the 
Federal Circuit. Second, that our observations might explain how subject 
matter-bounded courts work. 
A.  The Undoing of Congress’s Intent 
A larger picture that might be emerging from the analysis of this data is 
one in which the Supreme Court and the Executive Branch have been 
cooperating to undermine Congress’s goal for the Federal Circuit—that is, 
a uniform patent law, reasonably predictable in application. To begin with, 
when we say “undermine Congress’s goal for the Federal Circuit,” we are 
not announcing a conspiracy theory or some sort of centrally-managed 
artifice or scheme. We have something much more descriptive and 
mundane in mind: That actors capable of influencing the development of 
patent law—in particular, the Supreme Court and the Executive Branch 
(outside of the patent office)117—are working on patent law and may have 
goals that do not emphasize doctrinal uniformity.  
We have already described a possible role for the Supreme Court, both 
in terms of the content of its patent doctrine and its influence.118 What has 
not been highlighted so far is the role of the Executive Branch, particularly 
through the agency of the Solicitor General. It turns out that there is an 
association between the Supreme Court and the Executive Branch—via the 
                                                                                                                     
 116. Or at least some judges are, which would lead to the same result. This particular split is 
particularly evident in the en banc court’s fractured opinion in Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. 
Philips Electronics N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc). In that case, Judge 
Newman’s majority opinion relied heavily on principles of uniformity. Id. at 1276–77. In contrast, 
Judge O’Malley’s dissent drew strongly on principles of deference. Id. at 1296 (O’Malley, J., 
dissenting). 
 117. Arti Rai, for example, has documented non patent office executive branch intervention in 
patent law. Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for 
Policy Development, 61 DUKE L. J. 1237, 1240–41 (2012).  
 118. See supra Sections III.A.–B. 
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Solicitor General—capable of playing a role in reducing the uniformity and 
predictability of patent law. The association involves the Solicitor’s role in: 
(1) advising the Supreme Court about which patent cases to hear; and (2) 
advocating for a particular view of the law in the cases it advises the 
Supreme Court to hear. It is well known that the Supreme Court holds the 
Solicitor’s office in high regard, and it is common in patent cases for the 
court to follow the Solicitor’s recommendations.119 The Solicitor thus 
bears some responsibility, along with the Supreme Court, for the quality 
and content of Supreme Court patent jurisprudence.  
B.  Uniformity and Subject Matter-Bound Courts?  
Combining the mechanism just described with the evident decrease in 
patent law uniformity suggests the possibility that the Supreme Court and 
the Executive Branch are cooperating to undermine Congress’s goals for 
the patent law. If true, it’s not necessarily a bad thing. Aside from 
somewhat abstract separations of powers concerns, whether or not it 
matters if Congress’s goal of patent law uniformity is undermined depends 
immensely on the value of uniformity and the extent to which a uniform 
patent law differs from a good patent law. For example, Nard and Duffy 
have argued that the Federal Circuit’s decisional law is not only uniform, 
but badly flawed, and irretrievably entrenched in the hands of the Federal 
Circuit.120 This view may be incorrect based on empirics121 and the 
analyses of some,122 but not all,123 commentators. But if Nard and Duffy are 
                                                                                                                     
 119. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119–
20 (2013); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1689 (2012); Adam D. 
Chandler, Comment, The Solicitor General of the United States: Tenth Justice or Zealous 
Advocate?, 121 YALE L.J. 725, 725 (2011).  
 120. See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1627 (2007) (explaining that decentralized decision making can be 
uniform, while centralized decision making can “be internally inconsistent”). 
 121. See, e.g., David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, Legal Scholarship and the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Study of a National Circuit, 26 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1561, 1561 (2011) (reporting that the Federal Circuit uses legal scholarship—a 
potential source of information useful for doctrinal innovation—at a rate that appears similar to the 
regional circuits); Cotropia, supra note 16, at 801 (“[T]he Federal Circuit does not appear to be a 
court of a single-mind, as some commentators have suggested, at least as compared to other circuits. 
Rather, there is a good deal of dissent compared to other courts of appeals. This suggests that there 
are diverse views among Federal Circuit judges and that these judges are willing to play an active 
and vocal role in the law’s development.”). For additional studies showing doctrinal variations, see 
supra note 15. 
 122. See, e.g., S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity 
Principle: A Response to Nard and Duffy, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1735 (2007) (criticizing Professors 
Nard and Duffy’s argument that the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over patent litigation 
does not promote uniformity and rebutting the professors’ argument that increasing the number of 
judges to hear patent cases will not resolve the Federal Circuit’s shortcomings); see also Dreyfuss, 
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correct, then the disruption and resetting of the Federal Circuit’s decisional 
law that is documented and analyzed in this Article might be viewed as a 
very good thing. Of course if patent law already set the standards in the 
right places, and induced reliance on the part of many innovators, then 
disrupting the law and changing the standards may not be such a good 
thing.  
Whether patent law is good, in the sense that it sets the right standards 
to optimize incentives for innovation is, of course, a topic entirely 
different, and potentially much grander than the one addressed by this 
Article, which has contented itself with making a novel empirical 
contribution and developing new theoretical possibilities. But this Article 
at a minimum adds to a growing body of literature that suggests there is 
considerable doctrinal variety in Federal Circuit jurisprudence and that 
patent law, in the hands of a subject matter-bounded court, may have 
access to the tools and influences necessary to keep the law responsive to 
changing technological facts and emerging national interests. 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit is a response to a failure in judicial administration 
that produced a fractured, unworkable patent law that Congress concluded 
ill-served entrepreneurship and innovation. The purpose of vesting 
exclusive jurisdiction for patent appeals in the Federal Circuit was to 
permit that court to develop patent law in the direction of greater clarity 
and uniformity. This Article’s central empirical observation is a 
remarkable increase in decisional disagreement among Federal Circuit 
judges over the past several years, evidence suggesting a substantial 
decrease in patent law’s doctrinal uniformity. This Article discusses how 
actions taken by Supreme Court and personnel changes at the Federal 
Circuit, inter alia, may be cooperating to create disuniformity in patent 
law. The findings and discussion shed light on a limitation plaguing current 
debates about the Federal Circuit: A lack of knowledge concerning the 
extent to which patent law is both uniform, and susceptible to change and 
development.  
                                                                                                                     
In Search of, supra note 23, at 788 (arguing that “[t]he Federal Circuit . . . has proved to be a 
success in many important ways”). 
 123. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 13, at 9 (arguing to eliminate the Federal Circuit’s exclusive 
jurisdiction over patent cases and provide plaintiffs with a choice to file their claims with the 
regional circuit courts or the Federal Circuit); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 
101 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294774 (arguing “that 
empirical progress in patent law depends on greater policy diversity,” not uniformity). 
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Appendix A 
 
Field Field ID Description Form Coding Kappa 
1 Serial Unique record 
identifier
A[Integer] Machine NA 
2 Date Date issued [Day-Month-Year] Machine NA 
3 Year Year opinion 
issued
[month/day/year] Machine NA 
4 Origin Lower tribunal [Integer] Machine NA 
5 Case_Name Full Case title [Text] Machine NA 
6 Type Precedential or 
nonprecedential 
status of court 
document
[Precedential | 
Nonprecedential] 
Machine NA 
7 Appeal_Number Tracking number 
assigned by court
[Integer]-[Integer] Machine NA 
8 Doc_Type Opinion or order [Opinion | Order] Human 0.98 
9 En_Banc En banc status [Yes | No] Human [Rare 
Event] 
10 Judge_1 Name of first 
judge on panel 
[Text] Human 0.99 
11 Judge_2 Name of second 
judge on panel 
[Text] Human 0.99 
12 Judge_3 Name of third 
judge on panel
[Text] Human 0.99 
13 Opinion1_Type Identifies degree 
of agreement 
among panel
[Unanimous | 
Majority | Other] 
Human 0.93 
14 Opinion_1_Author Author of 
majority opinion 
[Text] Human 1.00 
15 Opinion2_Type Identifies degree 
of agreement 
among panel 
[Concurrence | 
Dissent | Both | 
Additional Views | 
[Blank]]
Human 0.93 
16 Opinion_2_Author Author of second 
opinion, if any 
[Text] Human 0.96 
17 Opinion3_Type Identifies degree 
of agreement 
among panel 
[Concurrence | 
Dissent | Both | | 
Additional Views | 
[Blank]]
Human 1.00 
18 Opinion_3_Author Author of third 
opinion, if any
[Text] Human [Rare 
Event] 
19 Notes Observations 
about case
[Text] Human N/A 
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